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Magid, Paul The Gray Fox: George Crook and the Indian Wars. University of
Oklahoma Press, $29.95 ISBN 9780806147062
A Controversial General in the Formative Days of Army Irregular Warfare
Strategy
This is the second volume in what Paul Magid projects as a trilogy on
General George Crook. The first volume, From the Redwoods to Appomattox
(Oklahoma, 2011), examined Crook’s career in antebellum California and the
Civil War (where he was engaged in both conventional and unconventional
operations, at, for example, Burnside’s Bridge and in Missouri). The Gray Fox
explores the decade after the Civil War, when Crook fought Paiutes (labelled
“Snakes" by the Americans), Apaches and Sioux, culminating in the Great Sioux
War of 1876 and 1877. The third volume will cover the final decade of Crook’s
career, when Crook proved unable to defeat Geronimo despite the uncommon
blend of tactical acumen and cultural empathy he had developed. As Magid puts
it, the post-Civil War decade showcased Crook’s dogged and often ruthless
aggressiveness in operations pursuing and fighting Indians: what the army today
labels “kinetic operations."
During this decade Crook began to develop the empathy toward Native
Americans for which he is best known, but he faced more of a guerrilla war
(against the Apache), and indeed something close to a conventional war (albeit
against very mobile opponents, against the Sioux and Cheyenne), than an
insurgency that would have placed a greater premium on that empathy. In other
words, the number of Indians given the geographic spaces in question was quite
low, and the United States sought to coerce them into concentration on
reservations (or “removal," as Magid titles both his chapters concluding the wars
against the Apache and Sioux). The military problem was to catch and defeat the
Indians—to “find, fix, fight, and finish" them—while the political problem, to
the extent there was one, was to balance the demands of eastern humanitarians
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with those of belligerent frontiersmen. Crook had already gained substantial
counter-guerrilla experience in Missouri during the Civil War: the Indians were
more elusive enemies, but the army faced fewer political restraints in its
operations against them than against the white Confederates in a state that the
government intended to readmit to the Union without permanently displacing its
population.
Magid provides nearly 400 pages of text, and nearly a hundred of notes. On
the whole the outlines and trajectory of Crook’s career (as noted above) are
already clear, and Magid does not substantially revise them. This is however
only the second modern scholarly biography, so Magid’s thorough detail and
careful citations will prove valuable for historians of the frontier army and its
wars. In particular, by examining the recriminations, public controversies, and
courts of inquiry that followed most engagements, Magid effectively relooks
most of Crook’s battles, while using the endnotes for valuable but parenthetical
elaboration. Crook himself presents a useful example for modern officers
engaged in what Western nations label irregular or unconventional warfare: he
was a contradictory and polarizing personality as well as a controversial general,
operating in complex and ambiguous circumstances with well-intentioned as
well as malevolent critics eager to pounce at every turn. As such, Magid agrees
with the late Charles M. Robinson, author of the other modern scholarly
biography, General Crook and the Western Frontier (Oklahoma, 2001), that
Crook found it difficult to balance and synthesize empathy with effective
military action.
On the whole, Magid is less critical of Crook as a general than was 
Robinson, but The Gray Fox is a very balanced analysis, and is particularly 
critical of Crook’s involvement in the murder of Crazy Horse: not that Crook 
ordered it, but that he did much to create the situation in which it occurred, and 
then left the area in order to avoid blame and damage to his reputation among the 
Indians (see pp. 383-85). Similarly, Magid begins The Gray Fox with a nuanced 
evaluation of Crook’s attitudes toward what we today consider (or recognize as) 
atrocities, observing that unlike other officers “he enjoined his troops to spare 
women and children whenever possible. Yet to him and most officers, such 
losses were often considered unavoidable; and they made no apologies, despite 
the obvious truth that sometimes the killing was deliberate and unnecessary" (p. 
18). These attitudes enabled the massacre at Steen’s Mountain on June 6, 1867, 
when soldiers and Indian scouts killed 27 of 57 Paiute women and children 
(along with more than thirty warriors, all but two of those present) in a dawn
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attack, and the survivors were enslaved by Crook’s Indian scouts. The attackers
lost one man. On a larger scale, Magid notes that during two years (1873-75)
following the surrender of major Apache leaders, more than 240 Indians were
killed (and approximately equal numbers captured) in 35 engagements,
compared with “several soldiers and scouts" (p. 417, note 2). Since these
engagements (battles seems the wrong term) were not large-scale dawn surprise
attacks on villages like those at Steen’s Mountain, the Marias, or the Washita,
the numbers suggest a relentless pursuit and little regard for the deaths inflicted
virtually any time an Apache was found outside reservation boundaries.
Magid’s conclusion assesses the differing opinions of contemporary
superiors, peers, and subordinates, of historians, and of the contemporary media
and Crook’s Indian opponents. The general’s peers and superiors, and their
biographers and historians, tended to be critical, whether from jealousy of
Crook’s success or from concern at his growing empathy for Indians, which
seemed to make him less aggressive and less militarily effective. His
subordinates shared in his success, felt much the same impulses toward empathy,
and admired him, sometimes to the point of adoration. In most cases, the more
exposure reporters had to him the more they praised him. To cap his case in
Crook’s favor, Magid observes that “the Indians both feared and respected his
abilities," “an epitaph that the old general surely would have appreciated" (p.
398). I look forward to Magid’s final volume; his trilogy will be required reading
for historians of the frontier army and its wars.
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